August 25, 2012 – LEBANON – Clashes between pro- and anti-Syrian factions in the Lebanese city of Tripoli killed three people including a Sunni cleric, jeopardizing a fragile truce, a security official said. The deaths brought to 14 the number of people killed in factional fighting in the Mediterranean port city over the past five days linked to the conflict in neighboring Syria. A further 110 people have been wounded, most of them shot by snipers. A sniper killed Sunni cleric Sheikh Khaled al-Baradei, 28, at dawn, sparking the flare-up between fighters from the pro-Syrian Alawite district of Jabal Mohsen and anti-Damascus Sunni districts, an AFP correspondent reported. One person died of his wounds in the Sunni Qobbeh area. A third died in the adjacent Sunni Bab al-Tebbaneh district, the security official said. The militiamen exchanged rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire in the two neighborhoods in the east of the city, Lebanon’s second largest, sparking several blazes, the correspondent reported. Families hammered holes through the walls of their apartments to escape to safety down makeshift ladders as the clashes raged. A journalist and a technician from Sky News Arabia were slightly hurt by stray bullets near the Sunni Bab al-Tebbaneh neighborhood, another scene of recent clashes on the city’s northern outskirts, medical sources said. Dozens of Sunni militiamen have encircled the Alawite district, with the army separating the rival gunmen, the correspondent said. The fighting continued until around 8:30 am (0530 GMT) when militiamen on both sides pulled back from the frontline, driving away on motorbikes, and a fragile calm returned. Six businesses in the city centre were later set ablaze — four Alawite-owned, one Sunni-owned, and the other a Christian-owned shop selling alcohol, the security official said. “We were surprised by this battle,” said Abu Othman, a gunman from the Sunni side. “They are the ones who opened fire, the Jabal Mohsen people.” Several families displaced by the fighting had returned to the two districts on Thursday to inspect the damage to their homes, as a truce agreed on Wednesday had appeared to take hold. –SBS
U.S. continues military build-up in the Mediterranean
By Gil Ronen
Syria’s envoy in Jordan, Bahajat Suleiman, says Syria can cause “heavy damage” to Israel’s nuclear facilities.
The statement by Suleiman appears on Jordanian news sourcesThursday, which quoted an unknown site identified with the regime of Bashar al-Assad. According to the report, Suleiman met a delegation that came to the Syrian embassy in Amman for Eid el-Fitr, and told them: “The nuclear weapons that the Zionists possess can cause us great loses in life in they attack Syria.”
“On the other hand,” he added, “we can cause heavy losses to their nuclear facilities and we will not need more than 20 missiles.”
Despite the differences in the number of casualties on both sides, the diplomat assessed, Israel will find the number of casualties and the strategic losses inflicted upon it too hard to bear.
An attack by Syria would cause emigration from Israel and be the beginning of its end, he added. He said that Syria would not stand by idly if attacked, but will not be the one to start a war.
Suleiman may have been reacting to alleged Israeli statements warning that Israel would have to take military action if it deems that, as a result of the Syrian civil war, Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons are about to fall into the possession of terrorists.
One of the central themes of Bible prophecy for the last days is the fate of the tiny nation of Israel. The Bible says that it will be restored to its ancestral home with its national identity, language, peculiar dietary laws, and unique religious practices intact.
Against all odds, the Jews have been restored to the land of their fathers. They have all the trappings of a nation, yet the Muslim worlddoes not accept them as a nation. From the moment of their restoration, their Muslim neighbors began plotting the Jews’ annihilation.
Several times, the surrounding Arab nations attacked tiny Israel, only to be defeated and lose territory in the process.
In fact, not since the era of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis, has the rhetoric against the Jews been so incendiary.
Of course, Iran is leading the way. Most of us are familiar with the calls by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s President, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, its Supreme Leader, for Israel to be wiped from the map. Most recently, that dynamic duo has been referring to the Jewish state as a “cancerous tumor” and “a fake Zionist outgrowth.” Various other Ayatollahs and Iranian military commanders are publicly echoing those disgusting terms and calling for Israel’s utter annihilation.
Though the United Nations meekly condemns the rhetoric as “shameful” and “hateful,” it does nothing about stopping it, despite the fact that the UN itself officially labels “incitement to genocide” as a “crime against humanity.” (In fact, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has decided to travel to Tehran and hobnob with some of the world’s most abusive dictators and regimes at next week’s summit of non-aligned nations. Apparently that “moral authority” and “walking the walk” stuff is considered overrated in international diplomatic circles, anyway.)
This steady stream of genocidal invective has flowed from Tehran and its allies for decades, but it has been ratcheted up since 2001. In fact, the Iranians and their proxies have become more blatant about their intentions to annihilate the Jews than was Hitler!
You know, one of Israel’s foundational principles is the motto: “Never again.” Simply put, this means that, based on their past experiences with the world sitting idly by as first one tyrant, then another, tries to exterminate them, the Jews have decided that “never again” will they trust their survival to global goodwill.
Bible prophecy tells us there will be one more pan-Arab attempt to eliminate the state of Israel and the Jewish race. We know that one of the attacking factions will be led by Iran and Russia. At this moment, it appears that Iran and Israel, which intends to defend itself against Iranian threats of nuclear attack, are on a collision course. And I suspect that collision will happen sooner, rather than later. Yet prophecy tells us that both Iran and Israel will still be here when Armageddon breaks out.
This week, I’m going to scoot out on a limb and tell you what I suspect might happen to slow down the plunge toward that eventual climactic confrontation.
Also, when we look at all the chaos, uncertainty, danger, and sheer insanity that surrounds us daily, it’s easy to become overwhelmed and discouraged. In those times, we all need to resort to the “Christian’s Standard Operating Procedure.” These are steps to be employed in times of crises, stress, and distress. In fact, it would be wise for each of us to employ the Christian’s S.O.P. every day of our lives. I promise you, it will make a difference in your walk with God.
Don’t miss this week’s Report on TBN, Daystar, Inspiration Network, CPM Network, various local stations, http://www.hallindsey.com or http://www.hischannel.com. Please check your local listings.
mail: HLMM, P.O. Box 470470, Tulsa, OK 74147
By George Friedman
Crises are normally short, sharp and intense affairs. Israel’s predicament has developed on a different time frame, is more diffuse than most crises and has not reached a decisive and intense moment. But it is still a crisis. It is not a crisis solely about Iran, although the Israeli government focuses on that issue. Rather, it is over Israel’s strategic reality since 1978, when it signed the Camp David accords with Egypt.
Perhaps the deepest aspect of the crisis is that Israel has no internal consensus on whether it is in fact a crisis, or if so, what the crisis is about. The Israeli government speaks of an existential threat from Iranian nuclear weapons. I would argue that the existential threat is broader and deeper, part of it very new, and part of it embedded in the founding of Israel.
Israel now finds itself in a long-term crisis in which it is struggling to develop a strategy and foreign policy to deal with a new reality. This is causing substantial internal stress, since the domestic consensus on Israeli policy is fragmenting at the same time that the strategic reality is shifting. Though this happens periodically to nations, Israel sees itself in a weak position in the long run due to its size and population, despite its current military superiority. More precisely, it sees the evolution of events over time potentially undermining that military reality, and it therefore feels pressured to act to preserve it. How to preserve its superiority in the context of the emerging strategic reality is the core of the Israeli crisis.
Since 1978, Israel’s strategic reality had been that it faced no threat of a full peripheral war. After Camp David, the buffer of the Sinai Peninsula separated Egypt and Israel, and Egypt had a government that did not want that arrangement to break. Israel still faced a formally hostile Syria. Syria had invaded Lebanon in 1976 to crush the Palestine Liberation Organization based there and reconsolidate its hold over Lebanon, but knew it could not attack Israel by itself. Syria remained content reaching informal understandings with Israel. Meanwhile, relatively weak and isolated Jordan depended on Israel for its national security. Lebanon alone was unstable. Israel periodically intervened there, not very successfully, but not at very high cost.
The most important of Israel’s neighbors, Egypt, is now moving on an uncertain course. This weekend, new Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi removed five key leaders of the military and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and revoked constitutional amendments introduced by the military. There are two theories on what has happened. In the first, Morsi — who until his election was a senior leader of the country’s mainstream Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood — is actually much more powerful than the military and is acting decisively to transform the Egyptian political system. In the second, this is all part of an agreement between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood that gives Morsi the appearance of greater power while actually leaving power with the military.
On the whole, I tend to think that the second is the case. Still, it is not clear how this will evolve: The appearance of power can turn into the reality of power. Despite any sub rosa agreements between the military and Morsi, how these might play out in a year or two as the public increasingly perceives Morsi as being in charge — limiting the military’s options and cementing Morsi’s power — is unknown. In the same sense, Morsi has been supportive of security measures taken by the military against militant Islamists, as was seen in the past week’s operations in the Sinai Peninsula.
The Sinai remains a buffer zone against major military forces, but not against the paramilitaries linked to radical Islamists who have increased their activities in the peninsula since the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Last week, they attacked an Egyptian military post on the Gaza border, killing 16 Egyptian soldiers. This followed several attacks against Israeli border crossings. Morsi condemned the attack and ordered a large-scale military crackdown in the Sinai. Two problems could arise from this.
First, the Egyptians’ ability to defeat the militant Islamists depends on redefining the Camp David accords, at least informally, to allow Egypt to deploy substantial forces there (though even this might not suffice). These additional military forces might not threaten Israel immediately, but setting a precedent for a greater Egyptian military presence in the Sinai Peninsula could eventually lead to a threat.
This would be particularly true if Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood impose their will on the Egyptian military. If we take Morsi at face value as a moderate, the question becomes who will succeed him. The Muslim Brotherhood is clearly ascendant, and the possibility that a secular democracy would emerge from the Egyptian uprising is unlikely. It is also clear that the Muslim Brotherhood is a movement with many competing factions. And it is clear from the elections that the Muslim Brotherhood represents the most popular movement in Egypt and that no one can predict how it will evolve or which factions will dominate and what new tendencies will arise. Egypt in the coming years will not resemble Egypt of the past generation, and that means that the Israeli calculus for what will happen on its southern front will need to take Hamas in Gaza into account and perhaps an Islamist Egypt prepared to ally with Hamas.
Syria and Lebanon
A similar situation exists in Syria. The secular and militarist regime of the al Assad family is in serious trouble. As mentioned, the Israelis had a working relationship with the Syrians going back to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1976. It was not a warm relationship, but it was predictable, particularly in the 1990s: Israel allowed Syria a free hand in Lebanon in exchange for Damascus limiting Hezbollah’s actions.
Lebanon was not exactly stable, but its instability hewed to a predictable framework. That understanding broke down when the United States seized an opportunity to force Syria to retreat from Lebanon in 2006 following the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. The United States used the Cedar Revolution that rose up in defiance of Damascus to retaliate against Syria for allowing al Qaeda to send jihadists into Iraq from Syria.
This didn’t spark the current unrest in Syria, which appears to involve a loose coalition of Sunnis including elements of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists. Though Israel far preferred Syrian President Bashar al Assad to them, al Assad himself was shifting his behavior. The more pressure he came under, the more he became dependent on Iran. Israel began facing the unpleasant prospect of a Sunni Islamist government emerging or a government heavily dependent on Iran. Neither outcome appealed to Israel, and neither outcome was in Israel’s control.
Just as dangerous to Israel would be the Lebanonization of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are linked in many ways, though Lebanon’s political order was completely different and Syria could serve as a stabilizing force for it. There is now a reasonable probability that Syria will become like Lebanon, namely, a highly fragmented country divided along religious and ethnic lines at war with itself. Israel’s best outcome would be for the West to succeed in preserving Syria’s secular military regime without al Assad. But it is unclear how long a Western-backed regime resting on the structure of al Assad’s Syria would survive. Even the best outcome has its own danger. And while Lebanon itself has been reasonably stable in recent years, when Syria catches a cold, Lebanon gets pneumonia. Israel thus faces the prospect of declining security to its north.
The U.S. Role and Israel’s Strategic Lockdown
It is important to take into account the American role in this, because ultimately Israel’s national security — particularly if its strategic environment deteriorates — rests on the United States. For the United States, the current situation is a strategic triumph. Iran had been extending its power westward, through Iraq and into Syria. This represented a new force in the region that directly challenged American interests. Where Israel originally had an interest in seeing al Assad survive, the United States did not. Washington’s primary interest lay in blocking Iran and keeping it from posing a threat to the Arabian Peninsula. The United States saw Syria, particularly after the uprising, as an Iranian puppet. While the United States was delighted to see Iran face a reversal in Syria, Israel was much more ambivalent about that outcome.
The Israelis are always opposed to the rising regional force. When that was Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, they focused on Nasser. When it was al Qaeda and its sympathizers, they focused on al Qaeda. When it was Iran, they focused on Tehran. But simple opposition to a regional tendency is no longer a sufficient basis for Israeli strategy. As in Syria, Israel must potentially oppose all tendencies, where the United States can back one. That leaves Israeli policy incoherent. Lacking the power to impose a reality on Syria, the best Israel can do is play the balance of power. When its choice is between a pro-Iranian power and a Sunni Islamist power, it can no longer play the balance of power. Since it lacks the power to impose a reality, it winds up in a strategic lockdown.
Israel’s ability to influence events on its borders was never great, but events taking place in bordering countries are now completely beyond its control. While Israeli policy has historically focused on the main threat, using the balance of power to stabilize the situation and ultimately on the decisive use of military force, it is no longer possible to identify the main threat. There are threats in all of its neighbors, including Jordan (where the kingdom’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is growing in influence while the Hashemite monarchy is reviving relations with Hamas). This means using the balance of power within these countries to create secure frontiers is no longer an option. It is not clear there is a faction for Israel to support or a balance that can be achieved. Finally, the problem is political rather than military. The ability to impose a political solution is not available.
Against the backdrop, any serious negotiations with the Palestinians are impossible. First, the Palestinians are divided. Second, they are watching carefully what happens in Egypt and Syria since this might provide new political opportunities. Finally, depending on what happens in neighboring countries, any agreement Israel might reach with the Palestinians could turn into a nightmare.
The occupation therefore continues, with the Palestinians holding the initiative. Unrest begins when they want it to begin and takes the form they want it to have within the limits of their resources. The Israelis are in a responsive mode. They can’t eradicate the Palestinian threat. Extensive combat in Gaza, for example, has both political consequences and military limits. Occupying Gaza is easy; pacifying Gaza is not.
Israel’s Military and Domestic Political Challenges
The crisis the Israelis face is that their levers of power, the open and covert relationships they had, and their military force are not up to the task of effectively shaping their immediate environment. They have lost the strategic initiative, and the type of power they possess will not prove decisive in dealing with their strategic issues. They no longer are operating at the extremes of power, but in a complex sphere not amenable to military solutions.
Israel’s strong suit is conventional military force. It can’t fully understand or control the forces at work on its borders, but it can understand the Iranian nuclear threat. This leads it to focus on the sort of conventional conflict they excel at, or at least used to excel at. The 2006 war with Hezbollah was quite conventional, but Israel was not prepared for an infantry war. The Israelis instead chose to deal with Lebanon via an air campaign, but that failed to achieve their political ends.
The Israelis want to redefine the game to something they can win, which is why their attention is drawn to the Iranian nuclear program. Of all their options in the region, a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities apparently plays to their strengths. Two things make such a move attractive. The first is that eliminating Iran’s nuclear capability is desirable for Israel. The nuclear threat is so devastating that no matter how realistic the threat is, removing it is desirable.
Second, it would allow Israel to demonstrate the relevance of its power in the region. It has been a while since Israel has had a significant, large-scale military victory. The 1980s invasion of Lebanon didn’t end well; the 2006 war was a stalemate; and while Israel may have achieved its military goals in the 2008 invasion of Gaza, that conflict was a political setback. Israel is still taken seriously in the regional psychology, but the sense of inevitability Israel enjoyed after 1967 is tattered. A victory on the order of destroying Iranian weapons would reinforce Israel’s relevance.
It is, of course, not clear that the Israelis intend to launch such an attack. And it is not clear that such an attack would succeed. It is also not clear that the Iranian counter at the Strait of Hormuz wouldn’t leave Israel in a difficult political situation, and above all it is not clear that Egyptian and Syrian factions would even be impressed by the attacks enough to change their behavior.
Israel also has a domestic problem, a crisis of confidence. Many military and intelligence leaders oppose an attack on Iran. Part of their opposition is rooted in calculation. Part of it is rooted in a series of less-than-successful military operations that have shaken their confidence in the military option. They are afraid both of failure and of the irrelevance of the attack on the strategic issues confronting Israel.
Political inertia can be seen among Israeli policymakers. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to form a coalition with the centrist Kadima Party, but that fell apart over the parochial Israeli issue of whether Orthodox Jews should be drafted. Rather than rising to the level of a strategic dialogue, the secularist constituency of Kadima confronted the religious constituencies of the Likud coalition and failed to create a government able to devise a platform for decisive action.
This is Israel’s crisis. It is not a sudden, life-threatening problem but instead is the product of unraveling regional strategies, a lack of confidence earned through failure and a political system incapable of unity on any particular course. Israel, a small country that always has used military force as its ultimate weapon, now faces a situation where the only possible use of military force — against Iran — is not only risky, it is not clearly linked to any of the main issues Israel faces other than the nuclear issue.
The French Third Republic was marked by a similar sense of self-regard overlaying a deep anxiety. This led to political paralysis and Paris’ inability to understand the precise nature of the threat and to shape their response to it. Rather than deal with the issues at hand in the 1930s, they relied on past glories to guide them. That didn’t turn out very well.
Print 334 111 628 192
Read more: The Israeli Crisis | Stratfor
The NATO meeting Tuesday was requested by Turkey after Syrian air defense batteries shot down a military jet, which Ankara claimed was on an unarmed training mission. Turkey did not ask the alliance for a military response, although its deputy prime minister Bulent Arinc said the shooting down of the plane “would not go unpunished.”
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report June 26, 2012, 11:59 AM (GMT+02:00)
Unconfirmed first reports from British, French and Turkish sources say British special operations forces crossed from Turkey into northern Syria Tuesday, May 26, and advanced up to 10 kilometers inside the country. The same sources report heavy fighting around the Presidential Guards compound on the outskirts of Damascus.
DEBKAfile’s military sources note that this compound exists to defend Bashar Assad’s presidential palace on Mount Qaisoun overlooking Damascus.
British and Gulf TV stations are again running interviews with dozens of Syrian soldiers taken prisoner by rebel forces and transferred to Free Syrian Army centers in South Turkey. But this time, they are being aired in conjunction with those two developments, indicating pivotal and coordinated military action inside the embattled country, or even the start of western intervention against the Assad regime.
Later Tuesday, Gulf military sources confirmed the presence of British special forces in Syria.
Our military sources estimate that the British military drive into Syria, if confirmed, is designed to establish the first safe zone along the Syrian-Turkish border, to be followed by more Western military incursions to establish additional zones of safe asylum in other parts of Syria.
This follow-up action would depend substantially on Syrian, Russian and Iranian (+ Hizballah) responses to the initial stage of the operation.
The reported British incursion, if confirmed, occurred at the tail end of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 24-hour visit to Israel Tuesday morning and would have posed a direct challenge to his repeated warning that Moscow would not tolerate Western military intervention in Syria and actively prevent it. Similar warnings have issued from Tehran.
As for the timing, the double military drive against Assad also occurred hours before a NATO “consultation” in Brussels on the shooting down of a Turkish warplane by Syria last Friday, June 22, which Ankara stated Monday “must not go unpunished.”
The two-pronged operation – the reported British incursion and major clash at the front door of Assad’s presidential palace – would appear to be designed to widen the cracks in his regime and speed its final breakup.
On June 11, DEBKAfile ran a video report on President Barack Obama’s decision to speed up limited action against Bashar Assad.
The Turkish military mobilized large numbers of reinforcements from its eastern provinces to the Syrian border on Tuesday, amid rising tension with Damascus, after the downing by Syria of a Turkish Air Force jet on Friday, Turkish media reported.
Large numbers of Turkish troops — including at least 15 long-range artillery pieces and tanks – moved to the Syrian frontier from the eastern city of Diyarbakir. A video published by the Turkish Cihan News Agency showed Turkish tanks being transported by carrier trucks toward the frontier.
The mobilization followed statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the Turkish military will respond to any future violation of its border by Syrian military elements.
“As awe-inspiring as Turkey’s friendship is, Turkey’s wrath is equally awe-inspiring,” Erdogan told the Turkish parliament on Tuesday.
“The rules of engagement of the Turkish Armed Forces have changed,” Erdogan said. “Any military element that approaches the Turkish border from Syria posing a security risk and danger will be regarded as a threat and treated as a military target.”
Erdogan closed his remarks with an especially harsh condemnation of Syrian President Bashar Assad: “Turkey and the Turkish people will continue to provide all support until the people of Syria have been saved from this tyrannical, murderous, bloody dictator and his gang.”
Opposition sources in Syria reported at least 86 civilians were killed by Assad troops on Tuesday.
The father of one of the two missing pilots who were shot down in Friday’s incident told Turkish newspaper Hürriyet Daily News that he opposed Turkey going to war over his son.
“It is not appropriate for a country to go to war over a pilot, an airplane or 50 airplanes,” Ali Erton said. He said he was aware of the risks his son took as a military pilot, but added “what matters is that my son serves his country.”
NATO’s North Atlantic Council condemned Tuesday Syria’s downing of the Turkish jet on Friday, but did not recommend military action for the act, as Ankara has requested.
At an emergency meeting, requested by Turkey and chaired by NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the council clearly denounced Syria’s aggression “in the strongest terms,” calling the shooting down of a Turkish jet over the Mediterranean “unacceptable.”
“It is another example of the Syrian disregard for international norms, peace and security, and human life,” said the NATO chief, expressing his solidarity with Turkey, but making no mention of retaliatory action.
During the meeting, Turkey briefed the North Atlantic Council on the downing Friday of its unarmed RF-4E reconnaissance jet over the Mediterranean Sea. It crashed into the sea a mile inside international waters. The two pilots are still missing.
The discussions were held under Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, which allows a NATO member, in this case Turkey, to request consultations if its security has been threatened, officials and diplomats said.
Turkey had asked the meeting be held under article 5, which stipulates an attack on any member country is an attack on all of NATO.
Rasmussen said NATO was following the situation closely. “I certainly expect that such an incident will not happen again,” he said.
The secretary-general has also repeatedly said that the alliance would need a clear international mandate, and regional support, before it embarked on a mission in Syria. Last year, NATO launched air attacks on Libyan government targets only after receiving a mandate from the UN Security Council, along with backing from the Arab League.
Syria said the downing was an accident, caused by the “automatic response” of an officer commanding an anti-aircraft position who saw an unidentified jet flying at high speed and low altitude.
But Erdogan said Syria shot down the unarmed plane in international airspace in a “deliberate” and “hostile” act and without warning. He said border violations in the region were not uncommon and that Syrian helicopters violated Turkish airspace five times recently, without Turkish response.
On Monday, Turkey revealed that a search and rescue plane sent to find the downed recon jet had been shot at as well, but did not crash.
The downing of the jet has aggravated tense ties between the two neighbors. Turkey has repeatedly called on Assad to step down as 33,000 Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey, fleeing a government crackdown on a popular uprising.
In Syria’s case, the Arab League hasn’t been able to agree on the need for military intervention. And Russia and China — both veto-wielding members of the Security Council — have consistently shielded Assad’s regime from international sanctions over its violent crackdown on protests. They have called on neighboring countries to refrain from provocative actions that could spark a wider war.
June 26, 2012 - Turkey Warns Syria Over Downed Jet: Buoyed by support from NATO allies, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pictured above) on Tuesday threatened a Turkish military response to any perceived threat from Syria along the troubled border following the disputed downing of a Turkish warplane.
“Every military element that approaches the Turkish border from Syria in a manner that constitutes a security risk or danger would be considered as a threat and would be treated as a military target,” he said in a speech to lawmakers attended by Arab diplomats. “From here, we warn the Syrian regime not to make any mistakes, not to test Turkey’s decisiveness and wisdom,” Mr. Erdogan said.
“We will continue to support the struggle of our Syrian brothers at all costs,” the prime minister said, referring to the armed opponents of Mr. Assad who are fighting an increasingly bloody insurgency. “We will continue to act in solidarity with our brothers until the Syrian people are freed of this cruel dictator,” he said. Follow the link below for the complete story relative to “Crisis in the Middle East.“
The Master of Disaster